

First-Order Logic Herbrand Theory

Herbrand universe

The **Herbrand universe** $T(F)$ of a **closed** formula F in Skolem form is the set of all terms that can be constructed using the function symbols in F (including the constants!).

In the special case that F contains no constants, we first pick an arbitrary constant, say a , and then construct the terms.

Formally, $T(F)$ is inductively defined as follows:

- ▶ All constants occurring in F belong to $T(F)$; if no constant occurs in F , then $a \in T(F)$ for an arbitrary constant a .
- ▶ For every n -ary function symbol f occurring in F , if $t_1, t_2, \dots, t_n \in T(F)$ then $f(t_1, t_2, \dots, t_n) \in T(F)$.

Note: All terms in $T(F)$ are variable-free by construction!

Example

$$T(\forall x \forall y P(f(x), g(c, y))) = \{c, f(c), g(c, c), f(g(c, c)), \dots\}.$$

Herbrand structure

Let F be a closed formula in Skolem form. A structure \mathcal{A} suitable for F is a **Herbrand structure** for F if it satisfies the following conditions:

- ▶ $U^{\mathcal{A}} = T(F)$, and
- ▶ for every n -ary function symbol f occurring in F and every $t_1, \dots, t_n \in T(F)$: $f^{\mathcal{A}}(t_1, \dots, t_n) = f(t_1, \dots, t_n)$.

Fact

If \mathcal{A} is a Herbrand structure, then $\mathcal{A}(t) = t$ for all $t \in U^{\mathcal{A}}$.

A **Herbrand model** of F is a Herbrand structure suitable for F that is model of F .

Matrix of a formula

Definition

The **matrix** of a formula F is the result of removing all quantifiers (all $\forall x$ and $\exists x$) from F . The matrix is denoted by F^* .

Fundamental theorem of predicate logic

Theorem

A closed formula in Skolem form is satisfiable iff it has a Herbrand model.

Proof (\Leftarrow): If a formula has a model then it is satisfiable.

(\Rightarrow): Let \mathcal{A} be a model of a closed formula F in Skolem form. We define a Herbrand structure \mathcal{T} suitable for F :

Universe: $U_{\mathcal{T}} = T(F)$

Function symbols: $f^{\mathcal{T}}(t_1, \dots, t_n) = f(t_1, \dots, t_n)$

(If F contains no constant, then

$a^{\mathcal{A}} = u$ for some arbitrary $u \in U^{\mathcal{A}}$)

Predicate symbols: $(t_1, \dots, t_n) \in P^{\mathcal{T}}$ iff $(\mathcal{A}(t_1), \dots, \mathcal{A}(t_n)) \in P^{\mathcal{A}}$

Claim: \mathcal{T} is also a model of F .

Claim: \mathcal{T} is also a model of F .

We prove a stronger assertion:

For every closed formula G in Skolem form that contains the same function and predicate symbols as F , if $\mathcal{A} \models G$ then $\mathcal{T} \models G$

Proof By induction on the number n of universal quantifiers of G .

Basis: $n = 0$. Then G has no quantifiers at all.

Hence, G is a boolean combination of atomic formulas without variables.

So $\mathcal{A}(G) = \mathcal{T}(G)$ (why?), and we are done.

Step: $n > 0$. Let $G = \forall x H$.

$$\mathcal{A} \models G$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{for every } u \in U^{\mathcal{A}}: \mathcal{A}[u/x](H) = 1$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{for every } u \in U^{\mathcal{A}} \text{ s.t. } u = \mathcal{A}(t) \\ \text{for some } t \in T(F): \mathcal{A}[u/x](H) = 1$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{for every } t \in T(F): \mathcal{A}[\mathcal{A}(t)/x](H) = 1$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{for every } t \in T(F): \mathcal{A}(H[t/x]) = 1 \quad (\text{Subst. Lemma})$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{for every } t \in T(F): \mathcal{T}(H[t/x]) = 1 \quad (\text{IH})$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{for every } t \in T(F): \mathcal{T}[\mathcal{T}(t)/x](H) = 1 \quad (\text{Subst. Lemma})$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{for every } t \in T(F): \mathcal{T}[t/x](H) = 1 \quad (\mathcal{T} \text{ is Herbrand struct.})$$

$$\Rightarrow \mathcal{T}(\forall x H) = 1 \quad (U^{\mathcal{T}} = T(F))$$

$$\Rightarrow \mathcal{T} \models G$$

Example

Let F and \mathcal{A} be given by

$$F = \forall x (x > \mathbf{0} \rightarrow \exists y (x > y \wedge y > \mathbf{0}))$$

$$\mathcal{U}^{\mathcal{A}} = \mathbb{Q}$$

$$\mathbf{0}^{\mathcal{A}} = 0$$

$$p >^{\mathcal{A}} q \Leftrightarrow p > q$$

\mathcal{A} is a model of F . The Skolem form of F is

$$G = \forall x (x > \mathbf{0} \rightarrow (x > f(x) \wedge f(x) > \mathbf{0})) .$$

Extending \mathcal{A} with e.g. $f^{\mathcal{A}}(p) = p/2$ makes \mathcal{A} a model of G .

Which is the Herbrand structure \mathcal{T} given by the proof of the fundamental theorem?

Example

The Herbrand structure \mathcal{T} is given by:

$$\mathcal{U}^{\mathcal{T}} = \mathcal{T}(G) = \{\mathbf{0}, f(\mathbf{0}), f(f(\mathbf{0})), \dots\} = \{f^k(\mathbf{0}) \mid k \geq 0\}$$

$$f^{\mathcal{T}}(f^k(\mathbf{0})) = f(f^k(\mathbf{0})) = f^{k+1}(\mathbf{0})$$

$$\begin{aligned} f^k(\mathbf{0}) >^{\mathcal{T}} f^{\ell}(\mathbf{0}) &\Leftrightarrow (f^k(\mathbf{0}))^{\mathcal{A}} >^{\mathcal{A}} (f^{\ell}(\mathbf{0}))^{\mathcal{A}} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (f^{\mathcal{A}})^k(\mathbf{0}^{\mathcal{A}}) >^{\mathcal{A}} (f^{\mathcal{A}})^{\ell}(\mathbf{0}^{\mathcal{A}}) \\ &\Leftrightarrow (f^{\mathcal{A}})^k(0) > (f^{\mathcal{A}})^{\ell}(0) \\ &\Leftrightarrow 0/2^k > 0/2^{\ell} \\ &\Leftrightarrow \text{false} \end{aligned}$$

The theorem guarantees that \mathcal{T} is also a model of G . This is indeed the case because the premise $x > \mathbf{0}$ of the implication is always false.

We have just shown:

Theorem

Let F be a closed formula in Skolem form.

Then F is satisfiable iff it has a Herbrand model.

What goes wrong if F is not closed or not in Skolem form?

Herbrand expansion

Let $F = \forall y_1 \dots \forall y_n F^*$ be a closed formula in Skolem form.

The **Herbrand expansion** of F is the set of formulas

$$E(F) = \{F^*[t_1/y_1] \dots [t_n/y_n] \mid t_1, \dots, t_n \in T(F)\}$$

Informally: the formulas of $E(F)$ are the result of substituting terms from $T(F)$ for the variables of F^* in every possible way.

Example

Some elements of $E(\forall x \forall y P(f(x), g(c, y)))$:

$$\begin{aligned} &P(f(c), g(c, c)) \quad P(f^2(c), g(c, c)) \quad P(f(c), g(c, f(c))) \\ &P(f^8(c), g(c, c)) \quad P(f(g(f(c), f(c))), g(c, f(g(c, f(c)))))) \end{aligned}$$

Note: The Herbrand expansion can be viewed as a set of propositional formulas over the set of variable-free atomic formulas.

Gödel-Herbrand-Skolem Theorem

Theorem

A closed formula F in Skolem form is satisfiable iff its Herbrand expansion $E(F)$ is satisfiable (in the sense of propositional logic).

Proof. By the fundamental theorem, it suffices to show that F has a Herbrand model iff $E(F)$ is satisfiable.

Let $F = \forall y_1 \dots \forall y_n F^*$.

\mathcal{A} is a Herbrand model of F

iff for all $t_1, \dots, t_n \in T(F)$, $\mathcal{A}[t_1/y_1] \dots [t_n/y_n](F^*) = 1$

iff for all $t_1, \dots, t_n \in T(F)$, $\mathcal{A}(F^*[t_1/y_1] \dots [t_n/y_n]) = 1$

iff for all $G \in E(F)$, $\mathcal{A}(G) = 1$

iff \mathcal{A} is a model of $E(F)$

Example

Let $F = \forall x (P(x) \vee Q(f(x)))$.

Herbrand universe:

$$T(F) = \{f^k(a) \mid k \geq 0\} = \{a, f(a), f(f(a)), \dots\}$$

Herbrand expansion:

$$\begin{aligned} E(F) &= \{P(f^k(a)) \vee Q(f^{k+1}(a)) \mid k \geq 0\} \\ &= \{P(a) \vee Q(f(a)), P(f(a)) \vee Q(f^2(a)), P(f^2(a)) \vee Q(f^3(a)), \dots\} \end{aligned}$$

\mathcal{A} is a Herbrand model of F

iff for all $k \geq 0$, $\mathcal{A}[f^k(a)/x](P(x) \vee Q(f(x))) = 1$

iff for all $k \geq 0$, $\mathcal{A}(P(x) \vee Q(f(x)))[f^k(a)/x] = 1$

iff for all $k \geq 0$, $\mathcal{A}(P(f^k(a)) \vee Q(f^{k+1}(a))) = 1$

iff \mathcal{A} is a model of $E(F)$

Herbrand's Theorem

Theorem

A closed formula F in Skolem form is unsatisfiable iff some finite subset of $E(F)$ is unsatisfiable.

Proof. Follows immediately from the Gödel-Herbrand-Skolem Theorem and the Compactness Theorem.

Example

We show that

$$F = \exists x \forall y P(x, y) \rightarrow \forall y \exists x P(x, y)$$

is valid, or, equivalently, that

$$\neg F \equiv \exists x \forall y P(x, y) \wedge \exists y \forall x \neg P(x, y)$$

is unsatisfiable.

Rectified form: $\exists x \forall y P(x, y) \wedge \exists z \forall v \neg P(v, z)$

Prenex form: $\exists x \exists z \forall y \forall v (P(x, y) \wedge \neg P(v, z))$

Skolem form: $\forall y \forall v (P(a, y) \wedge \neg P(v, b))$

Herbrand universe: $\{a, b\}$

Herbrand expansion: $\{ P(a, a) \wedge \neg P(a, b) , P(a, a) \wedge \neg P(b, b) , \\ P(a, b) \wedge \neg P(a, b) , P(a, b) \wedge \neg P(b, b) \}$

Semi-decidability Theorems

Theorem

- (a) *The unsatisfiability problem of predicate logic is (only) semi-decidable.*
- (b) *The validity problem of predicate logic is (only) semi-decidable.*

Proof. (a) Gilmore's algorithm is a semi-decision procedure.

(The problem is undecidable. Proof later)

(b) F valid iff $\neg F$ unsatisfiable.

Gilmore's Algorithm

Let F be a closed formula in Skolem form
and let F_1, F_2, F_3, \dots be a computable enumeration of $E(F)$.

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Input:  $F$   
 $n := 0$ ;  
repeat  $n := n + 1$ ;  
until  $(F_1 \wedge F_2 \wedge \dots \wedge F_n)$  is unsatisfiable;  
return "unsatisfiable"
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The algorithm terminates iff F is unsatisfiable.

Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem

Theorem

Every satisfiable formula of first-order predicate logic has a model with a countable universe.

Proof Let F_0 be a formula with free variables x_1, \dots, x_n for $n \geq 0$. Define $F := \exists x_1 \dots \exists x_n F_0$ and observe that F_0 has a model with universe U iff F has a model with universe U .

Let G be closed formula in Skolem form equisatisfiable with F as produced by the Normal Form transformations starting with F .

Fact: Every model of G is a model of F .

F_0 satisfiable $\Rightarrow F$ satisfiable
 $\Rightarrow G$ satisfiable
 $\Rightarrow G$ has a Herbrand model
 $\Rightarrow F$ has a model with universe $T(G)$
 $\Rightarrow F_0$ has a model with universe $T(G)$
 $\Rightarrow F_0$ has a model with countable universe
($T(G)$ is countable)

Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem

Formulas of first-order logic cannot enforce uncountable models